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COMMENTS
SHIPOWNER LIABILITY UNDER
SECTION 905(b) OF THE
LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT: A
PROPOSED STANDARD OF CARE
I. Introduction
In its enactment of the 1972 Amendments' to the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LWHCA),2 Con-
1. Pub. L. No. 92-576, §§ 2-22, 86 Stat. 1251 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976)).
2. The LHWCA was enacted by Congress in response to several decisions by the Su-
preme Court. These decisions include Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52
(1914) and Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). In Imbrovek, the Supreme
Court held that an action by a longshoreman against a shipowner was within the jurisdiction
of the federal courts. 234 U.S. at 62. The Court, in reaching this conclusion, noted that the
Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial power shall extend ... to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction." Id. at 58 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). The Court then
reasoned that since the plaintiff longshoreman was "injured on a ship, lying in navigable
waters, and while he was engaged in the performance of a maritime service," then, his claim
was maritime in nature. Id. at 61. In Jensen, the Supreme Court held that a workmen's
compensation award granted pursuant to a New York statute to the widow of a fatally in-
jured longshoreman constituted an encroachment by the state of New York upon the federal
courts' maritime jurisdiction and upon Congress's maritime authority. 244 U.S. at 215-17.
Following Jensen, Congress made two attempts to confer jurisdiction over all workmen's
compensation claims to the state courts. Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634; Act of
October 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395. The Supreme Court, however, found both these stat-
utes to be unconstitutional delegations of the federal courts' maritime jurisdiction. See
Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
253 U.S. 149 (1920).
As a result of these two Supreme Court decisions, longshoremen had no prospects for
coverage under a state workmen's compensation statute. In response to the longshoremen's
dilemma, Congress enacted the LHWCA in 1927. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, ch. 509, §§ 1-50, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927). The LHWCA, was modeled upon
New York's workmen's compensation statute. N.Y. WORK. ComP. LAW (Laws of 1922, ch.
615) (current version at N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAw §§ 1-328 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1980)).
Accordingly, the LHWCA provided an injured longshoreman with fixed benefits and barred
an injured longshoreman from bringing suit against his employer, the stevedoring company.
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, §§ 4-5, 44 Stat. 1424
(1927).The LWHCA did permit an injured longshoreman to recover damages against one,
other than his employer, who was liable in damages. Id. § 33.
For comprehensive discussions of the cases preceding the enactment of the LHWCA, see
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gress accomplished several objectives.3 First, Congress increased
significantly the maximum benefits" that could be paid to an in-
jured longshoreman.' Second, Congress nullified two Supreme
Court decisions, Seas Shipping Co. v. SierackiO and Ryan Steve-
doring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.7 In Sieracki, the Su-
preme Court permitted an injured longshoreman to maintain an
action against a shipowner premised upon the "unseaworthiness"
of the shipowner's vessel.8 A finding of "unseaworthiness" resulted
Hurst v. Triad Ship. Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1241-44 (3d Cir. 1977); Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schif-
fahrts Ges., 379 F.Supp. 759, 761-65 (E.D. Pa. 1974); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY § 6-45 (2d ed. 1975); Note, The Vessel Owner's Standard of Care under the
1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 23 Loy.
L. REV. 986, 987-92 (1977); Comment, Negligence Standards under the 1972 Amendments
to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: Examining the View-
points, 21 VILL. L. REV. 244, 245-52 (1976).
3. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate issued reports which set forth their
objectives in enacting the 1972 Amendments to the LWHCA. See H.R. Rep. No. 1441, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-14, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4698-711 [hereinaf-
ter cited as House Report]; S. Rep. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-16 (1972) thereinafter
cited as Senate Report]. Among Congress's principal objectives in enacting the 1972
Amendments was the protection of "the health and safety of employees who work on board
vessels." House Report, supra, at 4703.
4. Prior to the enactment of the 1972 Amendments, the maximum benefit which an in-
jured longshoreman could recover was $70 per week. The last increase had been in 1961. As
a result of the 1972 Amendments, the maximum weekly benefit was raised to "200% of the
national weekly wage [which was] to be determined annually by the Secretary of Labor."
House Report, supra note 3, at 4700.
5. In the interest of uniformity, this Comment will refer to those covered as a result of
the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA as "longshoremen." The coverage of these Amend-
ments extends, however, to "any person engaged in maritime employment, including any
longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor worker
including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker." 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1976). The
1972 Amendments do not cover "a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net."
Id.
6. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
7. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
8. 328 U.S. at 94-95. This case arose when a longshoreman, while working aboard the
defendant's vessel, was struck by a falling boom and tackle. This accident was found to be
the result of a defectively forged shackle which supported the boom. Id. at 87. The finding
that this condition rendered the defendant's vessel "unseaworthy" was undisputed. Id. at
88. The Supreme Court had previously restricted recovery under the "unseaworthiness"
cause of action to suits by a seaman against the shipowner. See generally Mahnich v. South-
ern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). In Sieracki, the Supreme
Court, in extending the "unseaworthiness" cause of action to longshoremen, reasoned that a
longshoreman "is doing a seaman's work and [is] incurring a seaman's hazards." Id. at 99.
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in the imposition of absolute liability upon the shipowner.e In
Ryan, a shipowner who had been held liable to an injured long-
shoreman was permitted to seek indemnity from the longshore-
man's employer, the stevedoring company. 10 This indemnification
action was based upon the stevedoring company's breach of an im-
plied warranty to perform its duties in a "workmanlike" manner."
As a result of the 1972 Amendments, section 905(b) of the
LHWCA provides that an injured longshoreman" can recover
damages against a shipowner only upon a showing of negligence.13
9. Id. at 94. The Court described the "unseaworthiness" cause of action as "essentially a
species of liability without fault," id., and stressed that the obligation of the shipowner to
maintain a "seaworthy" vessel could not be delegated. Id. at 100. In determining that a
longshoreman was entitled to an "unseaworthiness" cause of action, the Supreme Court said
that a longshoreman performed services which had traditionally been the responsibility of
the ship's crew. Id. at 99. There is, however, authority to suggest that the loading and un-
loading of vessels has not, for several centuries, been among the customary responsibilities
of the ship's crew. See Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to
Longshoremen, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1137, 1140-47 (1963).
10. 350 U.S. at 134-35. This case arose when a shipowner, after being held liable under
the LHWCA for injuries to a longshoreman who was working aboard his vessel, sought in-
demnity for these damages from the longshoreman's employer, the stevedoring company. Id.
at 127. The Supreme Court noted that while the LHWCA barred suits by injured longshore-
men against their employer, it fails to bar suits by other parties who seek to recover dam-
ages against the stevedoring company. Id. at 130.
11. Id. at 133. The Court said that a stevedoring company, upon entering into a contract
for its services, warrants that it will discharge its duties "in a reasonably safe manner." Id.
at 134. The Court also said that this warranty need not be express; it could also be implied
as "[i]t is of the essence of. . .[the] stevedoring contract." Id. at 133.
12. It should be noted that, typically, the shipowner is not the employer of the long-
shoremen. Rather, a shipowner seeking to have his vessel loaded or unloaded, contracts for
this purpose with a stevedoring company. The shipowner, to the extent necessary for these
cargo operations, relinquishes his vessel to the stevedoring company. The stevedoring com-
pany, in turn, employs the longshoremen and directs their work aboard the vessel. For a
detailed discussion regarding the nature of a longshoreman's work see M. NoRms, THE LAW
OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIEs §§ 1-7 (3d ed. 1975).
13. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976). Section 905(b) permits an injured longshoreman to recover
damages "caused by the negligence of a vessel" and provides that the stevedoring company
"shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements
or warranties to the contrary shall be void." Section 905(b) also provides that the "liability
of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or
a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred" and that the "[t]he remedy provided in
this subsection shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel." Id.
Section 905(b) allows an injured longshoreman to bring an in rem proceeding against a
vessel. This provision, however, does not bar an injured longshoreman from bringing a suit
in personam against the shipowner. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §
6-57 at 450 (2d ed. 1975). In the interest of uniformity, this Comment will generally refer to
actions against either the vessel or the shipowner as actions against the shipowner.
326 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IX
In addition, section 905(b) bars a negligent shipowner from seeking
indemnity from a stevedoring company."' Since the enactment of
the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA, the standard of care that a
shipowner owes to those who work aboard his vessel has been the
subject of both judicial consideration"' and legal commentary."
The House and Senate Reports on the 1972 Amendments and sec-
tion 905(b) of the LHWCA provide only limited guidance as to the
shipowner's standard of care.17 Congress chose, instead, to entrust
the judiciary with the primary responsibility for developing a stan-
dard of care.1 8
14. Following the enactment of the 1972 Amendments, the question remained as to
whether the shipowner would be required to pay an injured longshoreman's entire damages
when the conduct of both the shipowner and the stevedoring company contributed to the
longshoreman's injuries. See Shellman v. United States Lines Inc., 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528
F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). The Supreme Court in Edmonds
v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979), held that "a longshoreman
who is injured by the concurrent negligence of the stevedore and the ship may recover for
the entire amount of his injuries from the ship." Id. at 266.
15. See notes 21-174 infra and accompanying text.
16. See generally Gorman, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act-after the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 1 (1974); Hazen & Toriello, Long-
shoremen's Personal Injury Actions under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 53 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1 (1978); Robertson, Juris-
diction, Shipowner Negligence and Stevedore Immunities under the 1972 Amendments to
the Longshoremen's Act, 28 MERCER L. REv. 515 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Shipowner
Negligence & Stevedore Immunities]; Theis, Amended Section Five of the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 41 TENN. L. REv. 773 (1974); Comment, Develop-
ing a Consistent Theory of Vessel Liability to Injured Longshoremen under the LHWCA,
45 BROOKLYN L. Rgv. 731 (1979); Comment, Negligence Standards under the 1972 Amend-
ments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: Examining the
Viewpoints, 21 VILL. L. Rav. 244 (1976); Note, The Injured Longshoreman vs. the Ship-
owner After 1972: Business Invitees, Land-Based Standards, and Assumption of Risk, 28
HASTINGS L.J. 771 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Injured Longshoreman]; Note, The Ves-
sel Owner's Standard of Care under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 23 Loy. L. REv. 986 (1977).
17. Section 905(b) requires that the injured longshoreman's cause of action be based
upon the shipowner's negligence and not upon any warranty as to the "seaworthiness" of
the vessel. The. House Report, for example, provides that a shipowner's liability is
equivalent to the liability of "land-based" third parties and that the doctrines of asssump-
tion of risk and contributory negligence are inapplicable in determining the issue of ship-
owner liability. House Report, supra note 3, at 4702, 4705. The Senate Report on the 1972
Amendments to the LHWCA has the same provision. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 8, 12.
18. See House Report, supra note 3, at 4704. The development of a standard of care
"can only be resolved through the application of accepted principles of tort law and the
ordinary process of litgation." Id.
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Congress, in providing a negligence cause of action against the
shipowner, sought uniform application of this cause of action
throughout the nation's ports.19 Cases pertaining to section 905(b)
have arisen in all the "maritime" circuits.20 Differing opinions as to
what constitutes shipowner negligence have developed and con-
tinue to exist. Therefore, Congress's objective of a uniformly ap-
plied standard of care remains unfulfilled. Section II of this Com-
ment will discuss the initial decisions arising under section 905(b).
Section III will analyze recent efforts by courts to develop a stan-
dard of care for shipowners. Finally, in Section IV, a standard of
care for shipowners will be proposed.
II. The Initial Cases Arising Under Section 905(b)
A. The Application of Traditional Real Property
Concepts
An injured longshoreman's ability to recover under section
905(b) of the LHWCA was severely limited by the application of
traditional real property concepts.2 ' These concepts included, first,
conditions which were "open and obvious" and, second, conditions
which were within the "control" of the stevedoring company. A
court which found either of these conditions to be present invaria-
bly concluded that the shipowner was not negligent.22 Congress, in
its reports on the 1972 Amendments, made several references to
"land-based" principles of negligence in discussing the shipowner's
standard of care.2 Courts which heard the initial cases arising
under section 905(b) noted these references and sought to deter-
mine the "status ' 24 of one who worked aboard a vessel. A determi-
19. See id. at 4705.
20. Coverage under the LHWCA extends to injuries occuring on the navigable waters of
the United States (including piers, docks, and adjoining areas), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1976).
The circuits in which cases pertaining to section 905(b) have arisen include the First, Sec-
ond, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.
21. See notes 22-50 infra and accompanying text.
22. See Bovia v. S/S Agia Erini, 433 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (E.D. La. 1977); Cummings v.
"Sidarma" Soc., 409 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. La. 1976); Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 380
F. Supp. 222, 224 (E.D. Tex. 1974). See also notes 28-50 infra and accompanying text.
23. See House Report, supra note 3, at 4701-05. The Report states that shipowner liabil-
ity should be determined by the same criteria as the liability of "land-based third parties."
Id.
24. The "status" of one who entered upon another's land has traditionally determined
the "duty" which the landowner owed to him. Such "status" categories, in descending order
1980]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IX
nation of "status" was thereby made a prerequisite to any determi-
nation of shipowner liability.2
The consensus reached in these initial cases was that the "sta-
tus" of a longshoreman, working aboard a vessel, was that of a
"business invitee."' 26 Courts initially reached this conclusion by re-
lying on the fact that the stevedoring company's relationship with
the shipowner is that of an independent contractor.2 In Fedison v.
Vessel Wislica,25 a longshoreman, who was loading cargo on the
defendant's vessel, fell into an opening between two cargo crates.2
The longshoreman, in bringing suit, contended that the existence
of a space between the cargo crates constituted negligence on the
part of the shipowner."
The Fedison court, in rejecting the longshoreman's contention, 1
observed that the stevedoring company "which employed the
plaintiff was an independent contractor hired by the vessel to load
cargo."32 In addition, the court stated that "[iut is black-letter law
that the owner of a premise owes no duty to warn an invitee of a
defect or danger which is. . .obvious or which should be observed
by the invitee' in the exerAse of ordinary care."33 Although the
as to the standard of care, include invitees, licensees, and trespassers. See W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 58 at 357 (4th ed. 1971).
25. See notes 26-34 infra and accompanying text.
26. The "business invitee" or "business visitor" has traditionally been one whose entry
upon the landowner's property is premised upon business which concerns the landowner.
The landowner has a duty to warn such a person of those conditions within the landowner's
knowledge or which the landowner with reasonable care might discover. See PROSSER, supra
note 24, § 61 at 385.
27. See Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (D. Md. 1975);
Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 380 F. Supp. 222, 226 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
28. 382 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. La. 1974).
29. Id. at 5.
30. Id. at 6. The plaintiff longshoreman argued that the shipowner had "breached its
duty to provide him with a safe place to work." Id.
31. Id. at 5. The court noted that such openings are common and that longshoremen
generally ask their supervisors for dunnage (sheets of rough plywood) to cover these open-
ings. The court also noted that there was no significant evidence that any longshoremen had
requested dunnage from the ship's crew. Id.
32. Id. at 7.
33. Id. This statement by the court is in accord with the views of the late Dean Prosser.
A landowner has "no obligation to protect the invitee against dangers ...which are so
obvious and apparent to him that he may reasonably be expected to discover them." PRos-
sER, supra note 24, § 61 at 394 (footnotes omitted).
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court in Fedison gave additional reasons for its decision, 34 consid-
erable emphasis was placed upon the fact that the injury-causing
condition could be "readily observed by the plaintiff."
3 5
In addition to the court in Fedison, other courts, in the early
cases arising under section 905(b), also considered a longshoreman
to be a "business invitee" 6 and concluded that a shipowner had no
duty to warn a longshoreman of a condition which was "open and
obvious. '37 The trend that emerged from these early decisions was
that, when the injury-causing condition was "open and obvious,"
shipowner liability was precluded."
The concept of "control" over the cargo operations presented an-
other limitation to an injured longshoreman seeking to recover
under section 905(b). Early decisions indicated that when the
stevedoring company had "control" over the cargo operations,
shipowner liability could no longer arise. 9
One such case was Citizen v. M/V Triton,0 where the plaintiff
longshoreman was an employee of a stevedoring company that was
engaged in loading a cargo of flour sacks aboard the defendant's
vessel.4'1 The same stevedoring company had already, in another
port, loaded a portion of this cargo.'2 When the defendant's vessel
subsequently arrived, there were open spaces between the flour
34. The court noted, for example, that the cargo operation "was obviously within the
expertise of the stevedore and among its responsibilities as an independent contractor to
conduct . . . [this operation] in a safe manner." 382 F. Supp. at 8.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 540 F.2d 757, 759 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977); Crowshaw v. Koninkijke Nedlloyd, 398 F. Supp. 1224,
1230 (D. Ore. 1975); Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (D. Md.
1975); Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun K. K., 385 F. Supp. 644, 646 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Hite v. Mari-
time Overseas Corp., 380 F. Supp. 222, 226 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
37. See Cummings v. "Sidarma" Soc., 409 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. La. 1976). See gener-
ally note 36 supra.
38. One commentator, for example, in discussing the cases which arose shortly after the
enactment of the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA, noted that "the available decisions
that have reached the merits of the longshoreman's action against the shipowner have over-
whelmingly gone for the shipowner, twenty-one to three." Robertson, Negligence Actions by
Longshoremen Against Shipowners Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 7 J. MAR. L. & COM. 447, 453 (footnotes omitted).
39. See notes 40-50 infra and accompanying text.
40. 384 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
41. Id. at 199.
42. Id. The first part of this cargo was loaded in Galveston, Texas; the vessel then pro-.
ceeded to Beaumont, Texas, the port at which the plaintiff was injured. Id.
1980]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IX
sacks,'4 3 and the plaintiff longshoreman was injured when he
stepped into one of these spaces." As in Fedison,4 ' the plaintiff
contended that the existence of spaces within the cargo constituted
negligence on the part of the shipowner. e
In rejecting the longshoreman's contention, the Citizen court
noted that in both ports the stevedoring company "was in sole
charge of the loading of the bagged flour in the various hatches of
the vessel."'47 The Citizen court also observed that the manner and
method for loading the cargo was determined by the stevedoring
company and that the ship's crew was not a participant in this op-
eration.4 8 In holding that the shipowner had not been negligent,
the court stated that any duty which may have existed to discover
and correct the condition of the cargo rested upon the stevedoring
company.4 9 The stevedoring company had "control of the work be-
ing done in the [vessel's] hold." 0
B. Development of a Standard of Care
In the initial cases arising under section 905(b), courts described
instances in which shipowner liability could not arise but generally
declined thereby to provide a standard of care for shipowners.5
43. Id. at 200.
44. Id.
45. 382 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. La. 1974). See also notes 28-35 supra and accompanying text.
46. Citizen v. MNV Triton, 384 F. Supp. at 201. The plaintiff had argued that the ship-
owner was negligent in that he had constructive knowledge of an "unseaworthy" condition.
Id. Whether this condition would have constituted unseaworthiness under the law prior to
the 1972 Amendments is subject to debate. Compare Boutte v. MAV Malay Maru, 370 F.2d
906, 908 (5th Cir. 1967) (where plaintiff's foot "slipped into the space" between bales of
cotton the court failed to find unseaworthiness") with Strachan Ship. Co. v. Alexander, 311
F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1962) ("large hole" between stowed bales of cotton constituted un-
seaworthiness).
47. 384 F. Supp. at 200.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 201.
50. Id. (emphasis added). There were other cases arising shortly after the enactment of
the 1972 Amendments in which courts found the shipowner to be free of negligence when
the stevedoring company had "control" of either the cargo operations or of the vessel's work
area. See, e.g., Bess v. Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738, 742 (4th Cir. 1975) ("[tlhe allegedly
unsafe condition was the result of the loading process which was under the sole control of
the independent stevedoring company"); Cummings v. "Sidarma" Soc., 409 F. Supp. 869,
870 (E.D. La. 1976) ("(the] operation was under the exclusive management and control of
the stevedore company").
51. See notes 21-50 supra and accompanying text.
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There were, however, a few instances in which the the courts did
provide a standard of care. 2 In Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun K.K.,53 the
plaintiff and his fellow longshoremen were experiencing difficulty
in unloading a cargo of steel pipe from the defendant's vessel. 4
The plaintiff, while attempting to position a cable under one of the
pipes, was injured when the cable began "spinning wildly," striking
him in the chest.55 In his suit, the plaintiff contended that his in-
jury was the result of the shipowner's negligence.56
The Ramirez court, in granting the defendant shipowner's mo-
tion for summary judgment, 57 noted that "[t]he precise cause of
the accident was never satisfactorily established at trial."58 In ad-
dition, the court noted that the cargo had been certified as "safely
stowed,"" that any difficulties with the unloading had not been
brought to the attention of the ship's crew,60 and that any of the
longshoremen could have stopped the procedure when an unsafe
condition developed.' After reviewing the House Report on the
1972 Amendments to the LHWCA, 2 the court concluded that
"[tihe primary responsibility for the safety of the longshoreman
lies with the stevedoring company."' 3 The Ramirez decision is dis-
52. See Bovia v. S/S Agia Erini, 433 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (E.D. La. 1977); Frasca v. Pru-
dential-Grace Lines, Inc. 394 F. Supp. 1092, 1098 (D. Md. 1975).
53. 385 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
54. Id. at 646-47.
55. Id. at 647.
56. Id. at 653. The plaintiff argued that the shipowner had failed to "provide [him with]
a 'reasonably safe place to work.'" Id.
57. Id. at 654.
58. Id. at 648.
59. Id. at 646. This certification had been provided by an "independent cargo appraiser."
Id.
60. Id. at 653.
61. Id. at 648. Although a longshoreman may stop a procedure when an unsafe condition
develops, some courts have questioned whether the shipowner may assert this as a defense.
See Santos v. Scindia Steam Navig. Co., 598 F.2d 480, 488 (9th Cir. 1979); Napoli v. Hel-
lenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 509 (2d Cir. 1976).
62. 385 F. Supp. at 649-53.
63. 385 F. Supp. at 653. Other courts have reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Clem-
ons v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 596 F.2d 746, 750 (7th Cir. 1979); Chavis v. Finnlines, Ltd.
O/Y, 576 F.2d 1072, 1078 (4th Cir. 1978); McCarthy v. Silver Bulk Ship., Ltd., 487 F. Supp.
1021, 1028 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Murphy v. National Ship. Corp. of Pak., 459 F. Supp. 1173, 1178
(C.D. Cal. 1978); Espinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 405, 410 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 586 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1978); Valle v. Jugoslavenska Linejska Plovidba, 434 F. Supp.
608, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). It should be noted, however, that neither the House Report nor
the Senate Report on the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA provides that the primary
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tinguishable from other early cases concerning section 905(b) in
that the court proposed a standard of care for shipowners. The
court stated that
the shipowner must (1) exercise ordinary care to place the ship and equip-
ment in such condition that an experienced stevedore will be able, when
exercising ordinary care, to discharge the cargo in a workmanlike manner
and with reasonable safety to persons and property, and (2) give the steve-
dore warning of any concealed or latent defects that are known by the
shipowner. 4
It is also significant to note that the Ramirez court cited section
343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts." Section 343A pro-
vides that a landowner is not necessarily relieved of liability
merely because an injury-causing condition was "open and
obvious." 6
Following Ramirez, a number of courts adopted section 343A as
a standard of care for shipowners." Gay v. Ocean Transport &
Trading, Ltd.5 illustrates this development. In Gay, the fall of a
pallet resulted in injury to the plaintiff longshoreman. 9 This pallet
fell from the top of a stack of pallets after a boom wire had caught
on it.T0 The trial court, in granting summary judgment for the
shipowner, noted that the injury-causing condition had been cre-
ated by the stevedoring company.7' In addition, the trial court con-
responsibility for the safety of the longshoreman rests with the stevedoring company. A
statement that the primary responsibility is on the stevedoring company may, on occasion,
preclude inquiry as to the responsibility of the shipowner where such inquiry may be war-
ranted. It may be more appropriate for a court to examine the nature of the shipowner's
responsibility rather than categorically subordinating it to the responsibility of the stevedor-
ing company.
64. 385 F. Supp. at 646.
65. Id. Section 343A provides in pertinent part that:
A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any
activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the
possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 343A(1) (1965) (emphasis added).
66. See note 65 supra.
67. See Brown v. Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331, 333 (5th Cir. 1977); Anus-
zewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 540 F.2d 757, 759 (4th jCir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1098 (1977); Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 508 (2d Cir. 1976); Frasca v. Pru-
dential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092, 1101 (D. Md. 1975).
68. 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977).
69. Id. at 1240.
70. Id.
71. Id. Courts which heard the initial cases arising under § 905(b), in addition to finding
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sidered this condition to be "open and obvious" and known to both
the stevedoring company and the shipowner.72
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the findings of the trial
court as "not clearly erroneous. ' 78 The Fifth Circuit sought, how-
ever, to disavow any "possible intimation . . . that a vessel has no
duty concerning any danger which is open and obvious to the ste-
vedore or its employees. ' 7' The court acknowledged that the
"traditional rule '7 5 would relieve a landowner of any duty to warn
invitees of "open and obvious" dangers.76 The court in Gay stated,
however, that this rule was "premised in large part on the concepts
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk" and was
thereby inappropriate in section 905(b) cases.77 Therefore, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that this "traditional rule" should be re-
placed by the "modern trend '78 which was embodied in sections
343 and 343A of the Restatement.
the shipowner free of negligence when the injury-causing condition was open and obvious or
within the control of the stevedoring company, considered the shipowner to be free of negli-
gence when the injury-causing condition had been created by the stevedoring company. See
Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, S.A., 553 F.2d 837, 841 (2d Cir. 1977); Brown v.
Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331, 334 (5th Cir. 1977); Crowshaw v. Koninklijke
Nedlloyd, 398 F. Supp. 1224, 1229 (D. Ore. 1975).
72. Gay v. Ocean Trasp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d at 1240.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. See also note 33 supra and accompanying text.
76. 546 F.2d at 1240.
77. Id. at 1241-42.
78. Id. at 1241. "[Tlhe obviousness or knowledge of a dangerous condition on certain
property does not necessarily relieve the owner of his obligation to take further precautions
to remedy the danger." Id. (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 1242. In adopting §§ 343 and 343A of the Restatement, the court in Gay
sought to promote uniformity in regard to the shipowner's standard of care. 546 F.2d at
1242. Section 343 provides that:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a
condition on the land if, but only if, he
a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to
protect themselves against it, and
c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 343 (1965). For the text of § 343A see note 65 supra.
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C. Criticism of the Early Approaches to Section 905(b)
Liability
The application of the real property concepts of "invitee,"80
"open and obvious,""1 and "control"82 to the standard of care re-
quired of a shipowner became the subject of criticism.s It was ar-
gued that the courts' strict adherence to these "land-based" princi-
ples had resulted in unfair limitations upon an injured
longshoreman's ability to recover under section 905(b)."8
Regarding the classification of the longshoreman as a "business
invitee," one commentator contended that when an individual has
been classified as an invitee "technical niceties often exonerate a
landowner even when he [the landowner] has failed to exercise rea-
sonable care."85 Another commentator argued that any analogy be-
tween a longshoreman and an invitee was inappropriate in that in-
vitees on land are "basically self-reliant and aware" while maritime
employees are the beneficiaries of a "well-developed tradition of
solicitude."'86 Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in a case concern-
ing a social visitor aboard a vessel, rejected the use of terms such
as invitee in considering the shipowner's standard of care.87 In ad-
dition, state courts, in considering the issue of landowner liability,
80. See notes 26-38 supra and accompanying text.
81. Id.
82. See notes 39-50 supra and accompanying text.
83. See notes 84-101 infra and accompanying text.
84. See Shipowner Negligence & Stevedore Immunities, supra note 16 at 536; The In-
jured Longshoreman, supra note 16, at 772.
85. The Injured Longshoreman, supra note 16, at 787. It was noted, for example, that
where a "business invitee" has "assumed a risk" a landowner, despite negligent conduct, can
escape liability. Id. at 878 n.132.
86. Robertson, Negligence Actions by Longshoremen Against Shipowners Under the
1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 7 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 447, 451 (1976).
87. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959). In
Kermarec, an individual was injured while making a social visit aboard the defendant's ves-
sel. Id. at 626. The district court had classified the plaintiff as a "gratuitous licensee" and
had concluded that the defendant shipowner had not breached any duty to the plaintiff. Id.
The Second Circuit affirmed this decision. The Supreme Court, however, reversed and held
that the use of concepts such as "invitee" or "licensee" was inappropriate in determining
the shipowner's standard of care to those aboard his vessel. Id. at 630. The Court character-
ized these concepts as "inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the land" and said that
their application in contemporary society has "produced confusion and conflict." Id. at 631.
Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the shipowner's standard of care should be
"reasonable care under the circumstances of each case." Id. at 632.
[Vol. IX
SHIPOWNER LIABILITY
are in the process of abandoning the use of "status"
classifications.88
Criticism has also been addressed at the trend, which had
emerged in the early section 905(b) cases,8 ' whereby a shipowner
would be considered free of negligence when the injury-causing
condition was "open and obvious."' 0 Although section 343A of the
Restatement does contain a qualification in this regard," it has
been said that "[w]hether or not the open and obvious doctrine is
qualified, it presents a significant barrier" to an injured longshore-
man's ability to recover against a shipowner."2 A principal criticism
was that this "doctrine," despite the qualification contained in sec-
tion 343A, evoked the concepts of assumption of risk and contribu-
tory negligence.'3 It has been noted that sections 343 and 343A of
the Restatement define the shipowner's "duty in terms of the
plaintiff's perception, [while] frequently preventing inquiry into
the reasonableness of the ... [shipowner's] conduct."'" In addi-
tion, Congress, in enacting the 1972 Amendments, specifically
barred the use of assumption of risk and contributory negligence
from the consideration of shipowner liability.as Commentators, re-
lying on these conclusions, have stated that the concept of "open
and obvious" conditions are inappropriate in cases arising under
section 905(b) of the LHWCA."
88. See Oulette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364 A.2d 631 (1976); Basso v. Miller, 40
N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175
Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1968). See generally The Injured Longshoreman, supra note 16, at 786-87.
89. See notes 21-38 supra and accompanying text.
90. Reliance by the courts, in their application of § 905(b), upon the concept of "open
and obvious" has been characterized as a "left-handed application of of [sic] the doctrine of
assumption of risk." Shipowner Negligence & Stevedore Immunities, supra note 16, at 532.
91. Section 343A provides that liability for "open and obvious" conditions will not arise
"unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, § 343A(1) (1965) (emphasis added). See also note 65
supra.
92. Shipowner Negligence & Stevedore Immunities, supra note 16, at 533.
93. Id. at 532-34.
94. The Injured Longshoreman, supra note 16, at 772.
95. See House Report, supra note 3, at 4705. ("the admiralty concept of comparative
negligence, rather than the common law rule as to contributory negligence, shall apply in
cases where the injured employee's own negligence may have contributed to causing the
injury. Also ... the admiralty rule which precludes the defense of 'assumption of risk' in an
action by an injured employee shall also be applicable.").
96. See The Injured Longshoreman, supra note 16, at 781; Shipowner Negligence &
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Reliance by courts upon the concepts of "control 9 7 was also the
subject of unfavorable commentary. In addition to being character-
ized as "confusing and metaphysical,"" the concept of "control"
may present problems in its application. Occasionally, for example,
the assistance of crew members is necessary in cargo operations."
Members of the crew may be needed to open hatches or otherwise
assist the longshoremen.100 Therefore, if an injury to a longshore-
man occurs at a time when both crew members and longshoremen
are in the work area, a determination as to whether the shipowner
or the stevedoring company was in "control" at the time of the
injury could prove difficult.'
III. The Emergence of "Reasonable Care Under the
Circumstances"
The commentators, in criticizing the engrafting of traditional
real property concepts onto the standard of care for shipowners,
argued for a standard of care that was both free of these con-
cepts'02 and focused upon the conduct of the shipowner.' as In Gal-
lardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co., 0 4 such a standard of care was
adopted. In Gallardo, the longshoreman was injured when he
slipped and fell while working aboard the defendant's vessel. 0 5
The longshoreman contended that his injury was attributable to a
"slippery substance" on the ship's deck'06 and that the presence of
Stevedore Immunities, supra note 16, at 533.
97. See notes 39-50 supra and accompanying text.
98. The Injured Longshoreman, supra note 16, at 792.
99. See Cox v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, 577 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 881 (1979).
100. In Cox, the assistance of the crew was needed for the opening of hatch covers. 577
F.2d at 800.
101. This difficulty in determining the issue of "control" would most often exist in the
initial stages of a longshoring operation, where, for example, both the ship's crew and the
longshoremen may be jointly engaged in the preparation of the vessel.
102. See Shipowner Negligence & Stevedore Immunities, supra note 16, at 536 (as a
result of the "application of land-based occupiers' liability principles. . . it appears reason-
ably clear that waterfront safety is being adversely affected").
103. See The Injured Longshoreman, supra note 16, at 772. (the shipowner should be
required "to take reasonable remedial action with respect to all unreasonably dangerous
conditions of which it has actual or constructive knowledge").
104. 435 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
105. Id. at 486.
106. Id.
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this substance constituted negligence on the part of the defendant
shipowner.'0 7
The Gallardo court, in granting summary judgment,0 8 gave sev-
eral reasons for its finding that the shipowner had not been negli-
gent.10 9 First, the court noted that the House Report on the 1972
Amendments, while containing the phrase "land-based," does not
contain any specific references to terms such as "property" or "real
property."110 Furthermore, the court said that the phrase "land-
based" appears to be "no more than a descriptive label which con-
notes the opposite of 'sea-based' and which does not specifically
mean 'property-based.' "I" Regarding the classification of the long-
shoreman as an "invitee," the court expressed its disapproval by
noting that there is no mention of this term in the House Re-
port." 2 The Gallardo court concluded that Congress, in its reports
on the 1972 Amendments, "simply provided a loose framework of
variables from which to construct the standard of care required of
vessel owners."113
Second, the court in Gallardo rejected the use of sections 343
and 343A in cases arising under section 905(b) of the LHWCA." 4
Sections 343 and 343A placed undue emphasis upon the percep-
tions of the longshoreman and failed to place sufficient emphasis
107. Id. at 486-87. The plaintiff argued that the shipowner had failed to provide him
with a work area that was reasonably safe or, in the alternative, that the shipowner had
provided a reasonably safe work area but that the shipowner had subsequently learned of a
hazardous condition and had failed to remedy it. Id.
108. Id. at 486.
109. See text accompanying notes 110-18 infra.
110. 435 F. Supp. at 492.
111. Id. This view is shared by at least two commentators. See The Injured Longshore-
man, supra note 16, at 778 ("A fair reading of the [House] report suggests that the repeated
references to land-based principles were intended merely to emphasize the congressional
intent that no strict liability theory be developed to take the place of unseaworthiness.");
Shipowner Negligence & Stevedore Immunities, supra note 16, at 529 (there has been
"[u]ndue emphasis on this call for development of a body of shipowner negligence law by
analogy to 'land-based' occupiers' principles").
112. 435 F. Supp. at 492. The court rejected any "resort to terminology which prevents
inquiry into the reasonableness of conduct under the circumstances of a given case. Discus-
sions relating to invitees, contractors, primary and secondary responsibilities, obviousness of
dangers, and relinquishment of control all have the tendency to steer courts away from a
balance of the risk of harm against the utility of the particular conduct in question." Id. at
496.
113. Id. at 492.
114. See text accompanying notes 115-117 infra.
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upon the conduct of the shipowner. " 5 The court also said that sec-
tions 343 and 343A incorporate the concepts of assumption of risk
and contributory negligence " ' - concepts which Congress had
barred from any consideration of shipowner liability. "
Third, in addressing the issue of "control," the Gallardo court
said that any "analysis [of shipowner liabilty] based upon reten-
tion or relinquishment of control poses a potential for abuse by
courts which view the commencement of cargo operations as extin-
guishing the liability of vessels for injuries subsequently sustained
by longshoremen. ' '18
The court in Gallardo proposed, as an alternative to reliance
upon the concepts of "business invitee," "open and obvious," and
"control," that a shipowner's standard of care should be "reasona-
ble care under the circumstances." 11' The court believed that its
standard of care would be free of the rigidity which characterized
previous decisions and that it would provide the flexibility which is
needed in the determination of shipowner liability.120
It should be noted, however, that while the court in Gallardo
rejected reliance upon the concept of "control," the court did place
an analagous limitation upon its own standard of "reasonable care
under the circumstances." This limitation concerned the type of
knowledge that would be required of the shipowner before liability
on his part could arise. According to the Gallardo court, the ship-
owner would be required to exercise reasonable care when he had
either actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition
arising prior to the commencement of a stevedoring operation.
12 1
115. 435 F. Supp. at 494.
116. Id. See also notes 93-96 supra and accompanying text.
117. 435 F. Supp. at 492. See also note 95 supra.
118. 435 F. Supp. at 495. See also notes 97-101 supra and accompanying text.
119. 435 F. Supp. at 496. In adopting the standard of "reasonable care under the circum-
stances," the Gallardo court relied upon the Supreme Court's application of this standard in
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 632 (1959), a case which per-
tained to a shipowner's duty toward social visitors aboard his vessel. See notes 87-88 supra
and accompanying text.
120. 435 F. Supp. at 496. There have been at least two cases arising under § 905(b) in
which a shipowner, rather than a stevedoring company, was the employer of the longshore-
men. One court concluded that, in such an instance, a shipowner would be liable for failing
to provide a longshoreman with a "reasonably safe place to work." Napoli v. Hellenic Lines,
Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 507 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.,
610 F.2d 116, 126 (3d Cir. 1979).
121. 435 F. Supp. at 497-98. It is widely accepted that the shipowner's actual or con-
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As to a dangerous condition arising after the commencement of
stevedoring operations, the court said that the shipowner would
only be required to exercise reasonable care when he had actual
knowledge of this condition. 2
The court in Gallardo concluded that the defendant shipowner
had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of any conditions
that may have existed prior to the commencement of the stevedor-
ing operations.12 8 The court also found that the shipowner lacked
actual knowledge of any condition that may have arisen after the
commencement of the stevedoring operations.12 4 Accordingly, the
court in Gallardo held that the absence of this knowledge on the
part of the shipowner barred a finding of negligence.2 5
In subsequent cases arising under section 905(b), several courts
structive knowledge of the injury-causing condition is needed before liability under § 905(b)
can arise. See House Report, supra note 3, at 4704; Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d
334, 348 (1st Cir. 1980); Lawson v. United States, 605 F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir. 1979); McCar-
thy v. Silver Bulk Ship., Ltd., 487 F. Supp. 1021, 1026 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Garofalo v. Malaysia
Overseas Export Lines, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 166, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Murphy v. National
Ship. Corp. of Pak., 459 F. Supp. 1173, 1178 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
122. 435 F. Supp. at 496. In adopting two different criteria regarding the type of knowl-
edge required on the part of the shipowner before liability can arise, the court in Gallardo
acknowledged that this part of its standard of care is not supported by the House Report on
the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA. Id. The House Report provides that "nothing in this
bill is intended to derogate from the vessel's responsiblity to take appropriate corrective
action when it knows or should have known about a dangerous condition." House Report,
supra note 3, at 4704. Despite this language in the report, the Gallardo court said that "on
the basis of the testimony at trial. . . a ship should remedy only those dangerous conditions
arising after the longshoreman start work of which it has actual knowledge." 435 F. Supp. at
496. It should also be noted that the court in Gallardo, in making this distinction, relied
upon an analysis in which the different criteria for the shipowner's knowledge was proposed.
See The Injured Longshoreman, supra note 16, at 790-92.
123. 435 F. SUpp. at 498.
124. Id.
125. Id. By determining that the shipowner had neither actual nor constructive knowl-
edge of the injury-causing condition, the court found the shipowner to be free of negligence.
In reaching this conclusion, the court avoided a strict application of its standard of care.
According to this standard, the court should have initially determined when the injury-caus-
ing condition arose. Having made this determination, the court then should have considered
the type of knowledge to be required of the shipowner. Since the injury-causing condition in
Gallardo was a "slippery substance," the court may have been unable to determine when
this condition arose, and it was, therefore, necessary for the court to make determinations
under both parts of its knowledge requirement. This fact indicates a potential shortcoming
of the Galiardo standard in that there will be instances when a court is unable to determine
whether the injury-causing condition arose before or after the commencement of the steve-
doring operations.
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adopted the standard of care proposed in Gallardo.12 6 These
courts, in following Gallardo, also questioned the appropriateness
of any standard of care for shipowners that relied upon the con-
cepts of "open and obvious," "control," or upon sections 343 and
343A of the Restatement. 27
It should be noted, however, that the Gallardo standard, in re-
quiring that the shipowner have actual knowledge of an injury-
causing condition which arose after the commencement of the
stevedoring operation, presents two potential difficulties in appli-
cation. These potential difficulties are in determining when the in-
jury-causing condition arose and in determining when the steve-
doring operations commenced. As to the first difficulty, there have
been instances, for example, in which a defective piece of equip-
ment, aboard the vessel, caused the longshoreman's injury.12 8
Where the defect in this equipment resulted from wear, it may be
impossible to determine when this injury-causing condition
arose-that is, whether the defect arose before or after the com-
mencement of the stevedoring operation. 12 9
As to the second difficulty, there are instances in which the
ship's crew will assist the longshoreman in preparing the vessel for
cargo operations.130 If, during this period of preparation, a danger-
ous condition arises and, as a result, a longshoreman is injured,
then, according to the Gallardo standard, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether this condition arose before or after the commence-
ment of the stevedoring operation.' Consequently, a determina-
tion must be made as to whether the stevedoring operation
126. See Espinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 405, 412 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
586 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1978) (the court dismissed the longshoreman's complaint); Davis v.
Inca Compania Naviera S.A., 440 F. Supp. 448, 457 (W.D. Wash. 1977) (shipowner found to
be negligent); Darwin v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 501, 509-12 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (ship-
owner found to be negligent).
127. See note 126 supra. In Hickman v. Jugoslavenska Linijska Piovidba Rijeka, Zvir,
570 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1977), the Second Circuit, although not applying the Galiardo stan-
dard, stated, in a per curiam opinion, that "[tihe dichotomy of latent and obvious defects
referred to in the cases is not always controlling or pertinent in determining the liability of
the shipowner." Id. at 451.
128. See, e.g, Matthews v. Ernst Russ S.S. Co., 603 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1979) (defective
ladder); Santos v. Scindia Steam Navig. Co., 498 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1979) (defective winch).
129. Under the Gallardo standard, however, this determination is necessary to establish
the knowledge to be required of the shipowner before liability on his part can arise.
130. See notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text.
131. 435 F. Supp. at 496-98.
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commenced when the first longshoreman entered the work area,
when the last crew member left the work area, or at some point in
between. The outcome of this determination will decide, according
to the Gallardo standard, the type of knowledge to be required of
the shipowner."'3
Furthermore, the actual knowledge requirement of the Gallardo
standard conflicts with Congress's intent in enacting the 1972
Amendments to the LHWCA.'as Congress, through the 1972
Amendments, sought to establish circumstances in which a ship-
owner would be liable when he had either actual or constructive
knowledge of an injury-causing condition." 4
Although its actual knowledge requirement has failed to gain
wide acceptance, 3 5 the Gallardo standard is, nevertheless, a note-
worthy step in the development of a standard of care for shipown-
ers under section 905(b).'8 The Gallardo standard, by requiring
132. Id.
133. See note 122 supra.
134. Id.
135. In Blackburn v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Pa. 1978), the court,
in rejecting the Gallardo standard, said that despite a shipowner's actual knowledge of an
injury-causing condition, liability on the part of that shipowner may, nevertheless, be pre-
cluded in certain instances. Id. at 1305-06. Blackburn concerned a longshoreman who, in his
suit against a shipowner, alleged that his injuries resulted from the presence of oil and water
on the deck of the defendant's vessel. Id. at 1303. In considering the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the Blackburn court stated that shipowner liability extends to "condi-
tions" pertaining to the ship or its cargo and to circumstances in which the shipowner has
"control" over the cargo operations. Id. at 1305-06. It is only in these instances, according to
the Blackburn court, in which the shipowner's actual knowledge may give rise to liability.
Id. at 1306. The Blackburn court said that the shipowner has no "duty to correct stevedore-
caused conditions." Id. Accordingly, in such an instance, shipowner liability will not
arise-regardless of the shipowner's actual knowledge of these conditions. Id. The Black-
burn court noted, however, that a question did exist as to whether the shipowner, in this
case, had "control" over the cargo operations. Id. at 1307. Consequently, the court declined
to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1309.
Until recently, the Blackburn court's delineation of instances in which shipowner liability
may arise characterized the approach by courts in the Third Circuit to the issue of ship-
owner liability. See, e.g., Rich v. United States Lines, Inc., 596 F.2d 541, 553 (3d Cir. 1979);
Hurst v. Triad Ship. Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1248-49 (3d Cir. 1977); Dougherty v. Haaland, 457
F. Supp. 860, 865 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd, 601 F.2d 574 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992
(1979).
Recently, however, the Third Circuit has stated that in regard to shipowner liability
"[t]he sounder approach. . . imposes on vessel owners the. . . duty to exercise 'reasonable
care under the circumstances of each case.'" Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.,
610 F.2d 116, 125 (3d Cir. 1979).
136. The standard of care proposed in Gallardo, that the shipowner exercise "reasonable
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the shipowner to exercise "reasonable care under the circum-
stances," succeeds in focusing attention upon the conduct of the
shipowner.
In Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co.,1 3 7 the Ninth Circuit
adopted the requirement that the shipowner exercise "reasonable
care under the circumstances."""8 The Ninth Circuit declined, how-
ever, to adopt the Gallardo requirement that the shipowner must
have actual knowledge of an injury-causing condition arising after
the commencement of a stevedoring operation.13 9 In Santos, the
plaintiff longshoreman was injured when several sacks of wheat fell
from a pallet suspended above him. 10 The longshoreman attrib-
uted the fall of these sacks to a defective winch and contended
that a defect in the winch constituted shipowner negligence."" The
district court granted the defendant shipowner's motion for sum-
mary judgment,"" and the plaintiff appealed."8s In reversing the
decision of the trial court and remanding the proceedings," the
Ninth Circuit noted that the winch had been malfunctioning over
a period of two days and concluded that a question did exist as to
whether the shipowner had actual or constructive knowledge of
this condition.145
The Ninth Circuit, following a review of the Congressional re-
ports on the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA, proposed that the
following standard of care be utilized by the district court upon
remand:
care under the circumstances," has subsequently been adopted by courts in a number of
section 905(b) cases. See, e.g, Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 348 (1st Cir.
1980); Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116, 125 (3d Cir. 1979); Lawson
v. United States, 605 F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir. 1979). See note 126 supra.
137. 598 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1979).
138. Id. at 485.
139. Id. The standard of care adopted by the court in Santos refers only to the actual or
constructive knowledge of the shipowner; no distinction is made as to when the injury-caus-
ing condition arose. Id.
140. Id. at 482.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 483. The plaintiff argued that the district court had resolved "a number of
disputed material facts against him." Id.
144. Id. at 491.
145. Id. at 489. The Santos court noted, for example, that members of the ship's crew
had been "in the vicinity of the loading operation during the two days prior to the acci-
dent." Id.
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A vessel is subject to liability for injuries to longshoremen working on or
near the vessel caused by conditions on the vessel if, but only if, the
shipowner
(a) knows of, or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover, the con-
dition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to
such longshoremen, and
(b) the shipowner fails to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances
to protect the longshoreman against the danger."'6
According to this standard of care, liability under section 905(b)
can arise when the shipowner has either actual or constructive
knowledge of a dangerous condition. Unlike Gallardo, 7 there is no
provision in the Santos standard for an instance in which the ship-
owner's actual knowledge of the injury-causing condition is re-
quired before liability can arise. " 8
In addition to proposing this standard of care, the court in San-
tos addressed the issue of "control." The court said that while the
issue of "control" may be a valid consideration in determining
whether the shipowner had the opportunity to know of the injury-
causing condition, 149 "control" should not serve as a substitute for
an examination of the shipowner's conduct.110
Regarding sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement, the Santos
court, in concurrence with the Gallardo decision, viewed as inap-
propriate the application of these Restatement sections in cases
arising under section 905(b) of the LHWCA. 1'0 These sections of
the Restatement, according to the Ninth Circuit, are "inconsistent
with Congress'[s] explicit direction to reject common law rules of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk in favor of applying
the admiralty concept of comparative negligence. ' 15 2 In addition to
its proposed standard of care, Santos is important because the
court continued the trend, initiated in Gallardo, of eliminating re-
liance upon the concepts of "invitee" and "open and obvious" and
of focusing, instead, upon the reasonableness of the shipowner's
146. Id. at 485.
147. See notes 121-22 supra and accompanying text.
148. See text accompanying note 146 supra.
149. 598 F.2d at 490.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 486-87.
152. Id. at 486.
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conduct.1 53
A shipowner can be liable under section 905(b) only upon a find-
ing of negligence. 15  The Gallardo and Santos standards of care,
which refer to both the shipowner's conduct and knowledge, fail to
include one of the traditional elements of a negligence cause of ac-
tion.'5 5 This element is proximate causation.' 6 Although some
courts in cases arising under section 905(b) have discussed proxi-
mate causation, 157 this element of negligence has generally been
omitted from any standard of care.'"8 In Mattivi v. South African
Marine Corp.,59 the Second Circuit did include the issue of proxi-
mate causation in the shipowner's standard of care. 60
In Mattivi, the plaintiff, a carpenter working aboard the defen-
dant's vessel, slipped while walking on a "catwalk."''161 The trial
judge, despite finding that there was insufficient evidence to sup-
port the plaintiff's contention," 2 permitted the jury to determine
whether the shipowner had been negligent.' as The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant shipowner moved to
have this verdict set aside.'" The trial court granted the defen-
dant's motion, and the plaintiff appealed.' 5
153. Other courts have subsequently adopted the standard of care proposed by the court
in Santos. See Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 348 (1st Cir. 1980); Lawson v.
United States, 605 F.2d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1979).
154. See note 17 supra.
155. The traditional elements of a negligence cause of action are: duty, breach, proxi-
mate cause, and harm. See PROSSER, supra note 24, § 30 at 143.
156. Proximate causation is defined as "[a] reasonable causal connection between the
conduct and the resulting injury." Id.
157. See note 185 infra.
158. Both the Gallardo and Santos standards of care discuss the shipowner's knowledge
and his conduct; neither standard, however, discusses the issue of proximate causation. See
text accompanying notes 119-22 and 146-48 supra.
159. 618 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1980).
160. See text accompanying note 168 infra.
161. 618 F.2d at 165.
162. Id. at 166.
163. Id. While acknowledging the validity of the defendant shipowner's motion for sum-
mary judgment, the trial judge noted the reluctance of the Second Circuit to sustain such
motions on review. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. In granting the defendant shipowner's motion to set the verdict aside, the trial
court gave several reasons for its decision. It noted first, the lack of evidence that the plain-
tiff had slipped on anything, second, the lack of evidence that the defendant shipowner had
notice of any condition, third, the indication that the plaintiff would have been able to avoid
this condition, and fourth, that someone other than the shipowner would have been respon-
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The Mattivi court, in upholding the judgment of the trial court,
acknowledged the "confusion left in the wake of the 1972
[A]mendments to the LHWCA' ' e and proposed its own standard
of care for shipowners. 67 The Second Circuit stated that a
longshoreman
cannot prevail on his personal injury claim unless he proves by a preponder-
ance of the evidence: (1) that a dangerous condition actually existed on the
ship; (2) that the defendant shipowner had notice of the dangerous condi-
tion (and should have reasonably anticipated the plaintiff might be injured
by it); and (3) that if the shipowner was negligent, such negligence proxi-
mately caused the plaintiff's injuries. 68
The Second Circuit said that if the injured longshoreman "fails to
establish any of these elements, then the verdict must be for the
shipowner.""' The court also said there was no evidence that the
defendant had notice of the condition and that, even if the defen-
dant shipowner had notice, the mere presence of "a couple of
drops of oil" on a walkway did not constitute a dangerous
condition.17 0
A criticism can be made of the Mattivi standard in that it fails
to mention the degree of care to be exercised by the shipowner.
Thus, it is inconsistent with the current trend, as indicated by Gal-
lardo M  and Santos,17 to include in the standard of care the re-
quirement that the shipowner exercise "reasonable care under the
circumstances." Despite this shortcoming, the standard of care
proposed in Mattivi is noteworthy because it includes the issue of
proximate causation. Gallardo, Santos, and Mattivi have all con-
tributed to the development of a standard of care for shipown-
ers; s 73 however, a lack of consensus, in regard to this issue, contin-
ues to exist among the "maritime" circuits.1 74
sible for remedying such a condition. Id.
166. Id. at 168.
167. See text accompanying note 168 infra.
168. 618 F.2d at 168.
169. Id. A benefit of the standard of care proposed in Mattivi is that each of the three
requirements can be determined independently of the other two.
170. Id. at 169.
171. See notes 104-25 supra and accompanying text.
172. See notes 137-53 supra and accompanying text.
173. See notes 104-70 supra and accompanying text.
174. At present, the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits have as the basis for their stan-
dards of care that the shipowner exercise "reasonable care under the circumstances." See
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IV. A Proposed Standard of Care
Based upon the language of section 905(b),"75 the related Con-
gressional reports,'7  and the case law analyzed herein, 77 the fol-
lowing is offered as a proposed standard of care for shipowners.
To prevail in a negligence action against a shipowner, an injured
longshoreman, alleging that his injury was the result of a condi-
tion 178 aboard a vessel,'7 9 must prove that: 1) the condition was
the proximate cause of his injury; 2) the condition was unreason-
ably dangerous; 3) the shipowner had actual or constructive
knowledge of the condition; and 4) the shipowner failed to exer-
cise reasonable care under the circumstances. This proposed stan-
dard of care seeks to aid courts in their application of section
905(b) and to reflect traditional admiralty values of simplicity and
practicality.' 80
A. Proximate Causation
Cases frequently arise under section 905(b) in which an injured
longshoreman contends that a particular condition aboard the de-
fendant's vessel was the proximate cause of his injury. Such condi-
tions include cargo in disarray,"8 ' defective equipment, 82 and slip-
Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 348 (1st Cir. 1980); Griffith v. Wheeling-Pitts-
burgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116, 125 (3d Cir. 1979); Lawson v. United States, 605 F.2d 448,
452 (9th Cir. 1979). The Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have for the most part
continued to adhere to the reasoning of § 343A of the Restatement. See, e.g., Giglio v. Far-
rell Lines, Inc., 613 F.2d 429, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1980); Stockstill v. Gypsum Transp., 607 F. 2d
1112, 1116 (5th Cir. 1979); Clemons v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 596 F.2d 746, 748-49 (7th
Cir. 1979); Riddle v. Exxon Transp. Co., 563 F.2d 1103, 1111-12 (4th Cir. 1977).
175. See note 13 supra.
176. See House Report, supra note 3, at 4701-05; Senate Report, supra note 3, at 8-12.
177. See notes 21-174 supra and accompanying text.
178. The word "condition" is used here in a broad sense. Accordingly, it includes, but is
not limited to, physical characteristics of the ship or its cargo and procedures undertaken by
the shipowner or by the stevedoring company.
179. Since most cases arising under § 905(b) concern injuries occuring aboard vessels,
the term "vessel" is used in the proposed standard. It is important to note, however, that
coverage under § 905(b) of the LHWCA extends to those working on piers and similar ad-
joining areas. See note 20 supra.
180. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 631 (1959).
181. See Lopez v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 581 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1978); Briley v.
Charente S.S. Co., 572 F.2d 498, 499 (5th Cir. 1978); Valle v. Jugoslavenska Linejiska Plo-
vidba, 434 F. Supp. 608, 609-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
182. See McCarthy v. Silver Bulk Ship., Ltd., 487 F. Supp. 1021, 1025 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
McGuire v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 486 F. Supp. 1374, 1377 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Castel v. Moller,
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pery decks.' 8 A court may find that the proximate cause of the
longshoreman's injury was not the condition alleged by the long-
shoreman and conclude that the shipowner was free of negli-
gence." 4 In reaching such a conclusion, a court may have deter-
mined that the conduct of either the stevedoring company or a
fellow longshoreman was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's in-
jury.'8 5 Conversely, where a plaintiff longshoreman establishes that
a particular condition was the proximate cause of his injury, the
first part of the proposed standard of care would be satisfied.
B. Unreasonably Dangerous
Commentators,' Congress,'s7 and courts'"8 have acknowledged
that cargo operations are dangerous. In applying section 905(b),
A.P., 441 F. Supp. 851, 853 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
183. See Zielinski v. Companhia De Navgegacao Maritima, 460 F. Supp. 1179, 1182
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Murphy v. National Ship. Corp. of Pak., 459 F. Supp. 1173, 1175 (C.D. Cal.
1978); Davis v. Inca Compania Naviera S.A., 440 F. Supp. 448, 450 (W.D. Wash. 1977).
184. See note 185 infra.
185. See Clemente v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 728, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury was found to be a fellow longshoreman's operation
of a forklift); Talliercio v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 451 F. Supp. 949, 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(stevedoring company's failure to use proper hooks was determined to be the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury); Kalogeros v. Brasileiro, 446 F. Supp. 175, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(plaintiff's decision to hand-carry a 125 pound condenser down a flight of stairs was consid-
ered to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's subsequent injury).
186. See Steeg, The Exclusivity of Federal Longshoremen's Compensation after the
LHWCA Amendments of 1972, 10 J. MAR. L. & COM. 395, 395 (1978); Theis, Amended
Section Five of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 41 TENN. L.
REV. 773, 773 (1974); Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act Amendments of 1972: An End to Circular Liability and Seaworthiness in Return for
Modern Benefits, 27 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 94, 95 (1972) ("Traditionally, longshoring has been
one of the more hazardous occupations in the United States. This is probably due to the
everchanging and unfamiliar work area in which the longshoreman does his daily labor-the
ship.").
187. See House Report, supra note 3, at 4705 ("[L]ongshoring remains one of the most
hazardous of occupations."); Senate Report, supra note 3, at 2 ("Longshoring ... has an
injury frequency rate which is well over four times the average for manufacturing
operations.").
188. See generally Anderson v. Iceland S.S. Co., 585 F.2d 1142, 1153 (1st Cir. 1978) ("A
seagoing ship runs the constant risk of encountering severe weather. As a result, it is un-
likely that cargo, no matter how carefully stowed, will emerge unscathed and unblemished
from the journey. These conditions are known to exist and inhere in the very nature of
seaborne commerce."); Valle v. Jugoslavenska Linejiska Plovidba, 434 F. Supp. 608, 611
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("Shifting cargo ...is a common experience that stevedores frequently
and regularly encounter. They are well aware of the perils inherent in unloading cargo that
may have moved during the voyage.").
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courts have said, however, that for shipowner liability to arise the
longshoreman's injury must have been the result of an unreason-
ably dangerous condition.189
Although a determination as to whether a condition was unrea-
sonably dangerous will generally be made on a case by case basis,
courts should consider at least two criteria. First, the nature of the
injury-causing condition should be examined, 190 and, second, the
relative experience and skill of those working aboard the vessel
should be ascertained.1 91
It should be emphasized that the second part of the proposed
standard of care focuses exclusively upon the question of whether
the injury-causing condition was unreasonably dangerous. Conse-
quently, consideration of shipowner conduct in the second part of
the proposed standard would be inappropriate. Shipowner conduct
is the subject of the fourth part of the proposed standard of
care.
19 2
189. See Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 348 (1st Cir. 1980); Lawson v.
United States, 605 F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir. 1979); Anderson v. Iceland S. S. Co., 585 F.2d
1142, 1149 (1st Cir. 1978); Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 508 (2d Cir. 1976);
Zielinski v. Compania De Navegacao Maritima, 460 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Dougherty v. Haaland, 457 F. Supp. 860, 865 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 601 F.2d 574 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979); Espinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 405,
414 (S.D.N.Y.), afr'd, 586 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1978); Darwin v. United States, 435 F. Supp.
501, 511 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
190. In Clemons v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 596 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1979), a longshore-
man was injured when he stepped backwards into an open hatch. Id. at 747. The Seventh
Circuit reversed the decision of the trial court and entered a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict for the defendant shipowner. Id. at 750-51. In a case of this nature, the second part
of the proposed standard would require the court to determine whether this open hatch
constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition. In making this determination, a court
could note, for example, the degree of illumination existing in the work area, the presence or
absence of safety devices, and similar considerations.
At present, there is uncertainty as to the extent to which regulations promulgated pursu-
ant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1976),
can be used in the determination of shipowner negligence. For a case which discusses this
issue, see Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers, Ltd., 605 F.2d 438, 444-46 (9th Cir. 1979).
191. For eiample, while the presence of toxic fumes in the hold of a vessel may consti-
tute an unreasonably dangerous condition in regard to a longshoreman, the presence of
these fumes may not necessarily constitute an unreasonably dangerous condition to a suffi-
ciently skilled individual who has been hired for the specific purpose of removing these
fumes from the vessel's hold. See Hess v. Upper Miss. Towing Co., 559 F.2d 1030, 1036 (5th
Cir. 1977).
192. See notes 197-205 infra and accompanying text.
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C. Actual or Constructive Knowledge
Courts are in agreement that a shipowner must have either ac-
tual or constructive knowledge of an injury-causing condition
before liability on his part can arise. 193 In addition, the House Re-
port on the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA states that "nothing
in this bill is intended to derogate from the vessel's responsiblity
to take appropriate corrective action where it knows or should
have known about a dangerous condition. '" 194
The proposed standard's requirement of actual or constructive
knowledge on the part of the shipowner is twofold. First, the ship-
owner must know or should have known of the existence of the
injury-causing condition. Second, the shipowner must know or
should have known that this condition presented an unreasonable
risk of harm to those working aboard his vessel. 195
If, for example, a shipowner knows that a stevedoring company
is loading cargo in a particular manner, this fact alone is insuffi-
cient to fulfill the knowledge requirement of the proposed stan-
dard. In addition, the shipowner must know or should have known
that the loading procedure being utilized by the stevedoring com-
pany constituted an unreasonable risk of harm to the longshore-
men. Regardless of the point at which the injury-causing condition
arose,196 the third part of the proposed standard of care is fulfilled
193. See Anderson v. Iceland S.S. Co., 585 F.2d 1142, 1149 (1st Cir. 1978); Samuels v.
Empresa Lineas Maritimas, 573 F.2d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915
(1979); Wescott v. Impresas Armadoras, 564 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir. 1977); Ruffino v. Scindia
Steam Navig. Co., 559 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1977); McCarthy v. Silver Bulk Ship. Ltd., 487
F. Supp. 1021, 1026 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Garofalo v. Malaysia Overseas Export Lines, Inc., 470
F.2d 166, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Murphy v. National Ship. Corp. of Pak., 459 F. Supp. 1173,
1179 (C.D. Cal. 1978). See also note 195 infra.
194. House Report, supra note 3, at 4704 (emphasis added).
195. Recently, courts have noted that shipowner knowledge is twofold in nature. See
Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 348 (1st Cir. 1980); Griffith v. Wheeling-Pitts-
burgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116, 126 (3d Cir. 1979); Lawson v. United States, 605 F.2d 448,
452 (9th Cir. 1979); Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers, Ltd., 605 F.2d 438, 443 (9th Cir.
1978); Santos v. Scindia Steam Navig. Co., 598 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 1979).
196. The Gallardo standard, by contrast, provides that when an injury-causing condition
arises after the commencement of cargo operations, a shipowner can be liable only upon a
finding that he had actual knowledge of this condition. See notes 121-22 supra and accom-
panying text.
It was noted both that this provision of the Gallardo standard has failed to gain wide
acceptance and that it is inconsistent with the House Report on the 1972 Amendments to
the LHWCA. See note 135 supra and accompanying text; notes 133-34 supra and accompa-
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when a shipowner had either actual or constructive knowledge of
this condition.
D. "Reasonable Care under the Circumstances"
Courts, in applying section 905(b) of the LHWCA, have gener-
ally included the requirement of "reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances" in the standard of care for shipowners. ' 7 This re-
quirement was an essential feature of both the Gaflardo and
Santos standards of care.1 '8 In addition, the House Report on the
1972 Amendments to the LHWCA includes a reference to the ship-
owner's duty to exercise "reasonable care . . . under the cir-
cumstances."19'
Courts, in applying the standard of "reasonable care under the
circumstances," have provided at least two justifications for this
decision. First, it has been stated that this standard focuses atten-
tion upon the conduct of the shipowner.20 Second, courts have
noted that this standard is free of the encumbrances of real prop-
erty concepts such as "business invitee," "open and obvious," and
",control. 20 1
Courts applying the standard of "reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances" have done so on a case by case basis. 2  Congress, in
nying text.
197. See Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 348 (1st Cir. 1980); Griffith v.
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116, 125 (3d Cir. 1979); Lawson v. United States,
605 F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir. 1979); Anderson v. Iceland S.S. Co., 585 F.2d 1142, 1149 (1st Cir.
1978).
198. See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text. See also note 146 supra and accom-
panying text.
199. House Report, supra note 3, at 4704.
200. See generally Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 348 (1st Cir. 1980);
Lawson v. United States, 605 F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir. 1979); Santos v. Scindia Steam Navig.
Co., 598 F.2d 480, 490 (9th Cir. 1979); Davis v. Inca Compania Naviera S.A., 440 F. Supp.
448, 454 (W.D. Wash. 1977).
201. See generally Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 349 (1st Cir. 1980);
Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116, 125 (3d Cir. 1979); Santos v.
Scindia Steam Navig. Co., 598 F.2d 480, 488 (9th Cir. 1979); Espinoza v. United States
Lines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 405, 410 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 586 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1978).
202. It is important to note that the fourth part of the proposed standard is fulfilled
only when a shipowner fails to exercise reasonable care. Consequently, where a shipowner is
unable to take remedial action regarding a condition aboard his vessel, this fact will not
necessarily constitute a failure to exercise reasonable care.
The Second Circuit, in Munoz v. Flota Merchants Grancolombiana, S.A., 553 F.2d 837 (2d
Cir. 1977), observed that "[tlhe shipowner had no duty to supervise the minute details of
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its reports on the 1972 Amendments, established only broad guide-
lines for a determination as to whether a shipowner was negligent.
These guidelines reflect Congress's intent to both remove from the
shipowner the burden of absolute liability, 03 which had been im-
posed by the standard of "unseaworthiness, ' '2  and to promote, at
the same time, safety in the longshoring industry.2 0 5
V. Conclusion
The proposed standard of care comprises the four elements of
negligence which have been traditionally recognized 2 " and thereby
furthers Congress's objective of a uniformly applied standard of
care for shipowners.20 The element of harm is present in any ac-
tion under section 905(b) because such an action has, as its start-
ing point, an injured longshoreman. The first part of the proposed
standard encompasses the element of proximate causation. The
second and third parts of the proposed standard determine
whether a duty on the part of the shipowner has arisen. The
fourth, and final part of the proposed standard determines
whether the shipowner has, assuming this duty exists, breached
that duty.
One of Congress's primary objectives in enacting the 1972
Amendments to the LHWCA was to decrease the number of ac-
tions by injured longshoremen against shipowners.2 8 While the
1972 Amendments may have served to reduce the number of these
actions, there is reason to doubt whether this reduction has met
Congress's goal.20 9 The application of different standards of care,
work totally entrusted to the competence of the stevedore. Indeed, commercial reality and
applicable union regulations preclude a rule that would require a non-expert constantly to
intrude on the work of a master stevedore in the deepest recesses of the ship." Id. at 840-41.
203. See House Report, supra note 3, at 4702.
204. See generally notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text.
205. See House Report, supra note 3, at 4703.
206. See generally note 155 supra.
207. See generally House Report, supra note 3, at 4705 (intent expressed by Congress
that the negligence cause of action against shipowners be applied uniformly throughout the
nation's ports).
208. Id. at 4703. It was noted that longshoremen, as a result of the "unseaworthiness"
cause of action, "were being encouraged not to file claims for compensation or to delay their
return to work in the hope of increasing their possible recovery in a third party action." Id.
209. Elimination of the "unseaworthiness" cause of action has, in all probability, re-
duced the number of cases brought by injured longshoremen against shipowners. A lack of
consensus, however, among courts in regard to a shipowner's standard of care, may hinder
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particularly within the same circuit,21 0 has not furthered Con-
gress's objective of reducing the number of actions brought by in-
jured longshoremen against shipowners. Adoption of the proposed
standard may, however, aid in reducing this caseload. The four
parts of the proposed standard would apprise an injured long-
shoreman and a shipowner, prior to or at the outset of any action,
of the requirements for a finding of shipowner negligence.
Michael A. Viani
additioroal reduction in this case load.
210. The Second Circuit, for example, has generally been unable to demonstrate consis-
tency in defining a shipowner's standard of care toward longshoremen. Compare Mattivi v.
South African Marine Corp., 618 F.2d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 1980) (three requirements given for
shipowner liability: a dangerous condition, shipowner notice, and proximate causation) with
Giglio v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 613 F.2d 429, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1980) (reliance placed upon the
obviousness of the injury-causing condition, § 343A noted as providing the standard of
care). For a thorough analysis of the Second Circuit's handling of § 905(b) cases see Com-
ment, Developing a Consistent Theory of Vessel Liability to Injured Longshoremen under
the LHWCA, 45 BROOKLYN L. RaV. 731 (1979).
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